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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the United States has seen numerous corporate
scandals. Names like Enron, WorldCom, Arthur Anderson, and
Adelphia leave a bad taste in the mouths of investors, creditors, and
employees alike. In response to the large number of accounting and
securities frauds, the government enacted policies to curb the
questionable business practices occurring in corporate America.
Legislation like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has increased accountability for
corporate agents and deterred illegal business activity.' At the same
time, earlier legislation that had an intended purpose of targeting this
type of white-collar crime, such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO), is limited in its application in these
scenarios.2  One of the limitations of RICO is the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine. This doctrine bars a plaintiff from bringing a
conspiracy claim against a corporation and its agents if the agent is
acting within the scope of her employment or authority.3 The agent and
the corporation are considered to be the same entity, thus negating an
essential element of a conspiracy claim, the multiplicity of actors.4
Therefore, actions of the agent or employee are attributed to the
corporation, and the corporation cannot conspire with itself.
5
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The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine first arose in the antitrust
context.6 The application of the doctrine in this realm of law made sense
because of the difficulty for a corporation to conspire with itself in order
to create a monopoly or restrain trade.7 The doctrine was later extended
to federal discrimination cases where it was hard to determine how a
corporation would conspire with its agents to discriminate against
others. 8 At the same time, courts have noted at least two exceptions to
the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. First, the
doctrine does not apply when the conspiracy charge levied against the
defendant is criminal. 9 Second, the "personal stake exception" bars the
use of the doctrine when an agent has an independent stake in the
conspiracy.10 In recent years, a debate has existed in the appellate courts
over whether to apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to
conspiracy claims arising under RICO, 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)." The
Fourth and Eight Circuits have allowed the application of the doctrine
while the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have barred its use.1
2
The issue over whether the doctrine is applicable in this context remains
unresolved.
While the reasonings of the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
are flawed, the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine,
nevertheless, should be barred in civil RICO conspiracy cases. 13 The
recent wave of corporate fraud has resulted in a need for increased
deterrents to illegal business practices. The scandals of companies like
Enron and WorldCom have changed the perception of corporate
America, and more stringent policies are needed to restore faith in
corporations and the American economy in general. This Comment
seeks to show that the dissolution of the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine in RICO situations would help to supplement corporate reform
legislation, like the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in order to deter future illegal
business activity.
In this Comment, Part II examines the reasons underlying the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine and its historical applications in
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See id. at 1036-37 (noting that two executives could not conspire "to discriminate in
furtherance of the purpose of the business").
9. See id. at 1038 (noting an exception when the conspiracy arises under the federal criminal
code).
10. ePlus Tech., Inc. v. Aboud, 313 F.3d 166, 179 (4th Cir. 2002).
11. Kirwin v. Price Commc'ns Corp., 391 F.3d 1323, 1326 (11 th Cir. 2004).
12. Id. at 1326-27.
13. See infra Part II.
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different conspiracy situations. In addition, Part II discusses RICO
provisions and addresses the appellate court split in the application of the
doctrine in civil RICO conspiracy cases. Part III identifies the flawed
reasonings employed by the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits for
barring the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Part lII
attempts to show that there should be a distinction between criminal and
civil RICO conspiracies and that the purpose of RICO is not threatened
by the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. Part IV
asserts that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, nevertheless, should
not apply in civil RICO conspiracy cases due to the need for increased
deterrence of illegal business practices. Lastly, Part IV examines the
effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on deterrence and provides possible
implications for the dissolution of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.
II. BACKGROUND
A. History and Application of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine
1. Formation of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine
The essence of the doctrine is that agents of a corporation and their
actions are attributed to the corporation itself, which negates the multiple
actors requirement of a conspiracy claim.' 4 Because a corporation is a
single legal entity consisting of itself and its agents, it is impossible for
the two to conspire with each other.15 The first applications of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine arose in the antitrust context.' 6 The
theory makes sense logically in this context because a single corporation
could not attempt to restrain trade or monopolize a particular market
acting only with its agents.' 7 Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act
makes it illegal for any "person" to conspire to restrain trade.'
8
Similarly, § 2 makes it illegal for "persons" to conspire in an attempt to
monopolize trade or commerce. 9  Regardless of the fact that the
language of the Sherman Act proscribes any "person" from conspiring,
the Fifth Circuit held that "[a] corporation cannot conspire with itself any
more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts




18. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
19. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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of the agent are the acts of the corporation., 20 The Fifth Circuit reasoned
that the agents were merely "[doing] their day to day jobs in formulating
and carrying out [the corporation's] managerial policy."'2I At the same
time, the Fifth Circuit determined, in dicta, that a corporation and its
subsidiaries could be guilty of conspiring with each other to restrain
trade in violation of the Sherman Act but provided no reasoning for why
they should be considered separate entities.22 The adoption of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine has extended as far as to reach the
Supreme Court of the United States.
23
2. Application of the Doctrine in Federal Discrimination Conspiracy
Claims
While the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was first established to
preserve the purpose of the Sherman Antitrust Act, the doctrine was
extended to federal discrimination claims arising under 42 U.S.C. §
1985.24 Essentially, § 1985 lists several situations where it is illegal to
conspire to interfere with civil rights. Under § 1985(1), it is unlawful to
conspire to prevent an officer from performing his or her duties.
25
Section 1985(2) makes it illegal to conspire to obstruct justice or
26intimidate a party, witness, or juror. Lastly, § 1985(3) makes it
unlawful for "two or more persons" to conspire to deprive someone of
their rights or privileges entitled under the law.2 7 In Dombrowski v.
Dowling,28 the Seventh Circuit held that the requirements of § 1985 were
not satisfied when "two or more executives of the same firm" acted in
furtherance of the discriminatory purposes of the business. 29 In the case,
the employees of a prospective landlord corporation would not rent space
to a white lawyer who represented minority clients, and the lawyer
brought a claim alleging the employees and the corporation had
discriminated against him. 30 The court inferred that there could be
20. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911,914 (5th Cir. 1952).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 777 (1984) (stating that
a corporation and its subsidiary "are incapable of conspiring with each other for purposes of § I of
the Sherman Act").
24. McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1035-36 (11 th Cir. 2000).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(1) (2000).
26. Id. § 1985(2).
27. Id. § 1985(3).
28. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1972).
29. Id. at 196.
30. Id. at 191.
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situations where an agent's actions could fit the requirements of a
conspiracy, but the situation where the alleged discrimination is a single
act by the corporation perpetrated by two or more agents "will normally
not constitute the conspiracy contemplated by [§ 1985(3)].y,31 The facts
of Dombrowski failed to establish that the actions conducted by the
agents were not a "single act of discrimination by a single business
entity" and the plaintiffs § 1985(3) conspiracy allegation was not
established.3 2 This application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
has been extended to the Second,33 Fourth,3 4 Fifth,35 Sixth,36 and Eighth
Circuits37 as well.
3. Criminal Conspiracy Exception to the Intracorporate Conspiracy
Doctrine
While the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine has been recognized in
antitrust and federal discrimination civil cases, there is an established
exception to the doctrine in federal criminal conspiracy cases. Eighteen
U.S.C. § 371 makes it a crime for "two or more persons [to] conspire...
to commit any offence against the United States. 3 8 In Dussouy v. Gulf
Coast Investment Corp. ,3  the Fifth Circuit acknowledged that "a
corporation can be convicted of criminal charges of conspiracy based
solely on conspiracy with its own employees. 4 ° While the conspiracy in
Dussouy arose under a state statute,4' the Eleventh Circuit extended the
application of the exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to
conspiracy claims arising under § 371 .42 The Eleventh Circuit's rationale
31. Id. at 196.
32. Id.
33. See Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that
the plaintiff did not "assert that the individual defendants were acting other than as officers and
directors" and, therefore, dismissing the § 1875(3) claim).
34. See Buschi v. Kirven, 775 F.2d 1240, 1253 (4th Cir. 1985) (stating that the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine was applicable to bar plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim).
35. See Benningfield v. City of Houston, 157 F.3d 369, 378-79 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating that the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applied in the § 1985(3) claims).
36. See Hull v. Cuyahoga Valley Joint Vocational Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 926 F.2d 505, 509-
10 (6th Cir. 1991) (stating that plaintiffs § 1985(3) claim was barred by the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine).
37. See Cross v. Gen. Motors Corp., 721 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating the
plaintiff's § 1985(3) claim was barred by the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000).
39. 660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981).
40. Id. at 603 (citing United States v. Consol. Coal Co., 424 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Ohio 1976)).
41. Id. at 597.
42. United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 972 (11 th Cir. 1982), overruled on other grounds by
KANSAS LAW REVIEW
in United States v. Hartley was that the personification of corporations
was meant to extend liability to corporations, not to limit criminal
liability for agents of corporations.43 The use of the doctrine in this
context is flawed since "the action by an incorporated collection of
individuals creates the 'group danger' at which conspiracy liability is
aimed, and the view of the corporation as a single legal actor becomes a
fiction without a purpose." 4  This exception has been applied to § 371
conspiracy claims in the First,
45 Sixth,46 Eighth,47 and Ninth Circuits.
48
B. Application of the Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine in RICO
Conspiracies
1. History and Application of RICO Provisions
Initially, RICO was enacted to "eliminate the influence of organized
crime on American business., 49 The Act contains criminal penalties for
violations of § 1962 including fines and imprisonment. 50  The Act also
allows for civil plaintiffs to bring claims against RICO defendants and
"recover triple their provable damages." 5' By allowing civil plaintiffs to
bring claims, the RICO Act helps 'to supplement Government efforts to
deter [racketeering activity]."' 52  In general, courts have broadly
interpreted the language of the statute.53 This broad interpretation of
RICO was originally necessary to encompass all the different criminal
activities the mafia could commit. 54  There is evidence that Congress
intended for RICO to apply only in organized crime cases, but today
United States v. Goldin Indus., Inc., 219 F.3d 1268 (i1 th Cir. 2000).
43. Id at 970.
44. Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 603.
45. See United States v. Peters, 732 F.2d 1004, 1008 (1st Cir. 1984) (stating that actors could
be convicted of conspiratorial actions conducted within the scope of authority).
46. See United States v. Ames Sintering Co., 927 F.2d 232, 237 (6th Cir. 1990) (stating that a
corporation may be convicted in a criminal context for conspiring with its agents).
47. See United States v. Hugh Chalmers Chevrolet-Toyota, Inc., 800 F.2d 737, 738 (8th Cir.
1986) (stating that a corporation may be responsible for the conspiracy of its agents).
48. See United States v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 20 F.3d 974, 978-79 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply in § 371 cases).
49. Alexander M. Parker, Stretching RICO to the Limit and Beyond, 45 DUKE L.J. 819, 819
(1996).
50. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2000).
51. Parker, supra note 49, at 820.
52. Adam Bain & Ugo Colella, Interpreting Federal Statutes of Limitations, 37 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 493, 566 (2004) (quoting Rotella v. Wood 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000)).
53. Parker, supra note 49, at 820.
54. See id (stating that "the breadth of RICO is directly related to the breadth of its predicate
offenses").
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RICO has been stretched to its "maximum breadth" and applies in
numerous situations outside of the mafia.55
2. Overview of RICO Provisions
Eighteen U.S.C. § 1962 lists the various prohibited activities under
RICO. A RICO claim under any of the subsections requires "'1) a
person who engages in 2) a pattern of racketeering activity, 3) connected
to acquisition, establishment, conduct, or control of an enterprise."'' 56 In
order for conduct to constitute a "pattern of racketeering activity," the
person must have committed at least two predicate acts of racketeering
activity. 57  "Racketeering activity," as defined in section 1961(1),
encompasses a wide variety of criminal activity ranging from simple
bribery to crimes relating to chemical weapons.58 Subsection (a) makes
it illegal
for any person who has received any income derived, directly or
indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection
of an unlawful debt ... to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part
of such income, or proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce.
Essentially, subsection (a) "prohibits the investment or improper use
of money obtained from racketeering activity."60 Under subsection (b) it
is "unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or
through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or
indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged
in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 61
For subsections (a) and (b), there has to be a connection "between the
claimed RICO violations and the injury suffered by the plaintiff.
62
55. Id. at 833-34.
56. Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 204 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting 855 F.2d 241, 242) (emphasis
omitted).
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2000).
58. Id. § 1961(1)(Supp. 2006).
59. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (2000).
60. Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2000).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
62. Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 205 (5th Cir. 1995).
063
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In Crowe v. Henry, as an example, the plaintiff correctly pleaded
63both § 1962(a) and (b) violations of RICO. In the case, the plaintiff
suffered damages from a § 1962(a) violation when "[f]unds that he
owned, that were allegedly fraudulently taken. . ., were invested into the
enterprise and used to reduce the indebtedness on land that [the plaintiff]
allege[d] was taken from him through a pattern of racketeering
activity." 64 Also, the plaintiff correctly asserted a § 1962(b) claim when
he "alleged that [the defendant] gained ownership of his land and the
farming venture through a pattern of racketeering activity." 65 In each
claim, the plaintiff asserted that there was a "person," the RICO
defendants, who engaged in a pattern of racketeering through an
"enterprise," plaintiffs farm and land, which resulted in damages to
him.66
While subsections (a) and (b) are fairly specific, the remaining two
subsections of § 1962 are easier to meet, so causes of action under these
two subsections are more common. Subsection (c) makes it illegal "for
any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct
or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful
debt., 67  Subsection (c) claims are easier to bring than subsection (b)
claims because a RICO defendant only has to be "associated" with an
enterprise rather than "acquire" or "maintain" an enterprise.68  The
control element of subsection (b) "requires more than a general interest
in the results of [the enterprise's] actions, or the ability to influence the
enterprise through deceit."
69
The last provision, section 1962(d), states, "[i]t shall be unlawful for
any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a),
(b), or (c) of this section., 70 A RICO plaintiff is not required to prove




66. See id. (stating that the plaintiff properly alleged violations of § 1962(a) and (b)).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
68. See Tal v. Hogan, 453 F.3d 1244, 1268 (10th Cir. 2006) (stating that it is more difficult to
bring a § 1962(b) claim due to the "control" requirement).
69. Id.
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
71. See Efron v. Embassy Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 21 (lst Cir. 2000) ("A conspiracy
claim under section 1962(d) may survive a factfinder's conclusion that there is insufficient evidence
to prove a RICO violation .... (citing Howard v. Am. Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir.
2000)) (emphasis omitted)).
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Rather, a claim fails only "if the pleadings do not state a substantive
RICO claim upon which relief may be granted., 72 Therefore, a RICO
plaintiff may bring a conspiracy claim under § 1962(d) without having to
worry about the loss of a supplemental claim brought under one of the
other subsections of § 1962 affecting the conspiracy claim. While at first
glance it appears that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine will apply in
§ 1962(d) claims similarly to antitrust and federal discrimination cases,
in reality, the situation is more complex.
3. Application of Intracorporate Conspiracy Doctrine in Appellate
Courts
The most recent application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
has occurred in the realm of civil RICO conspiracies. When it comes to
§ 1962(d) conspiracy claims, the appellate courts are split on the issue of
whether the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should be
allowed. Both the Fourth and Eighth Circuits have applied the doctrine,
at least in dicta, barring RICO conspiracy claims arising under §
1962(d).73 On the other hand, the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have failed to extend the doctrine to RICO conspiracies.74 Each of these
circuits have had different fact patterns and applied different reasonings
for either prohibiting or allowing the use of the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine.
a. Eighth Circuit's Reasoning
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine in Fogie v. THORN Americas, Inc.75 In Fogie, the
only alleged participants in the conspiracy were the parent company and
72. Id.
73. See ePlus Tech., Inc. v. Aboud, 313 F.3d 166, 179 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that generally the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine bars conspiracy claims between agents and corporations (citing
Bowman v. State Bank of Keysville, 331 S.E.2d 797, 801 (Va. 1985))); Fogie v. THORN Ams., Inc.,
190 F.3d 889, 899 (8th Cir. 1999) (stating that the parent corporation and its subsidiaries could not
conspire with each other).
74. See Kirwin v. Price Commc'ns Corp., 391 F.3d 1323, 1327 (1 1th Cir. 2004) (stating that
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not apply in § 1962(d) claims); Webster v. Omnitrition
Int'l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 1996) (agreeing with the reasoning of the Seventh Circuit in
barring the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine); Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d
1271, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine threatens the purpose
of RICO).
75. 190 F.3d 889.
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its wholly owned subsidiaries.76 The court held that "as a matter of law a
parent corporation and its wholly owned subsidiaries are legally
incapable of forming a conspiracy with one another., 77 The court looked
to Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp. for guidance on the
issue.78  In Copperweld, the Supreme Court reasoned that a parent
corporation and its subsidiaries shared the same consciousness and "a
complete unity of interest., 79 A parent and a subsidiary rely on the same
set of economic resources and have the same purpose.80 There are not
"two separate corporate consciousnesses," and there could not be any
meeting of the minds since the two already share this "complete unity of
interest. '81 In addition, if the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine did not
apply, then the result would not be a deterrence to conspire, but rather a
deterrence from forming wholly owned subsidiaries.82 In Fogie, the
Eighth Circuit noted that there was a "lack of distinctiveness" between
the corporation and its subsidiaries.83 Looking at the facts of the case
and applying the reasoning of Copperweld, the court held that the parent
company and its subsidiaries formed a single consciousness, thus, the
two could not conspire with each other.84
b. Fourth Circuit's Reasoning
While acknowledging that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
exists, the Fourth Circuit did not apply the doctrine in ePlus Technology,
Inc. v. Aboud due to the personal-stake exception.8 5  While the court
generally agreed that acts of agents are treated as acts of the corporation
itself,86 it held there is an exception to the doctrine where the agent has
87an independent stake in the conspiracy. In ePlus Technology, the
76. Id. at 898.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984)).
79. 467 U.S. at 771.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 772-73 (stating that corporations would rather form unincorporated divisions to
avoid the rule).
83. 190 F.3d at 899.
84. Id.
85. See ePlus Tech., Inc. v. Aboud, 313 F.3d 166, 179 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
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defendant agent, Aboud, siphoned money out of the corporation. 88 The
personal-stake exception applied since Aboud had a stake that was
completely distinct from her connection to the corporation. 89 Aboud's
siphoning of assets promoted her own interests and was in fact contrary
to the interests of the corporation.9" The Fourth Circuit limited the
application of the personal-stake exception to situations where the
agent's stake in the conspiracy is "independent of his relationship to the
corporation." 9'
While this exception has been applied in the Fourth Circuit, other
appellate courts have not extended the principle in civil RICO conspiracy
cases in their jurisdictions. This personal-stake exception has been
recognized in the Tenth Circuit with a conspiracy arising under 42
U.S.C. § 1985(2).92 The exception applied where the coworkers'
"personal stake" in achieving the corporation's illegal objective was
distinct from the corporation's stake.93 At the same time, the Sixth
Circuit denied the application of the personal-stake exception in a
Sherman Antitrust conspiracy claim.94 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that it
was "not convinced that an agent acting with anticompetitive motives
due to some independent personal stake raise[d] sufficient antitrust
concerns to warrant abandoning the traditional rule that a principal
cannot conspire with one of its agents." 95  The application of the
exception in one context and not the other can likely be attributed to the
court's ability to determine whether an individual has a "personal stake"
in the conspiracy. In Brever, it is easy to see how the coworkers had an
interest to make sure that the plaintiff did not testify as to the illegal
operation of an incinerator since their jobs would be on the line.96 It is
harder to imagine how medical staffs would have an independent stake in
a conspiracy with a hospital to create a monopoly that is different from
the corporation's objective.97 While these appellate courts have debated
the application of the exception in other conspiracy contexts, the only
88. Id. at 179-80.
89. Id. at 179.
90. See id at 179-80 ("Aboud had no interest in seeing MBT profit: the point of the MBT bust-
out scheme was to send the corporation into bankruptcy.").
91. Id. at 179.
92. Brever v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 40 F.3d 1119, 1126-27 (10th Cir. 1994).
93. Id.
94. Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605, 615 (6th Cir. 1990).
95. Id.
96. See Brever, 40 F.3d at 1127 (stating that coworkers had an independent interest to deter her
testimony).
97. See Nurse Midwifery, 918 F.2d at 615 (stating the personal-stake exception did not apply
merely because the agents acted with some independent stake).
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appellate court to address the issue in RICO conspiracy cases has been
the Fourth Circuit.
98
c. Seventh and Ninth Circuits' Reasoning
Both the Seventh and Ninth Circuits failed to extend the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to civil RICO conspiracy claims. In
Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, the Seventh Circuit distinguished the holding
in Copperweld from a conspiracy arising under § 1962(c). 99 The RICO
defendants in the case asserted that the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine did not apply between a corporation and its accountant. 00 The
Seventh Circuit recognized that the conspiracy in Copperweld between a
corporation and its subsidiaries did not affect the overall goal of the
Sherman Act-to protect competition. 10' On the other hand, the court
held that barring claims due to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in
RICO civil conspiracies did threaten the purposes of RICO: to "prevent[]
the infiltration of legitimate businesses by racketeers and separat[e]
racketeers from their profits."'02  The Ninth Circuit used the same
reasoning in Webster v. Omnitrition International, Inc.'0 3  The court
agreed that the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine was correct and the defense was not allowed to bar §
1962(d) claims.' °4  These appellate courts focused solely on the
underlying purpose of RICO in barring the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine.
d. Eleventh Circuit's Reasoning
The Eleventh Circuit has held the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
inapplicable in civil conspiracy claims for different reasons than the
other appellate courts. In Kirwin v. Price Communications Corp.,'
0 5
former minority shareholders asserted a civil RICO conspiracy claim
against the corporation, its subsidiaries, and its CEO.10 6 The Eleventh
98. See ePlus Tech., Inc. v. Aboud, 313 F.3d 166, 179-80 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
personal-stake exception barred the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine).




103. 79 F.3d 776, 787 (9th Cir. 1996).
104. id.
105. 391 F.3d 1323 (11 th Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 1324.
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Circuit recognized that a split existed within the appellate courts
pertaining to the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine for
§ 1962(d) claims. 10 7  Instead of following the reasoning of any of the
other appellate courts, the court looked to a similar case within the
Eleventh Circuit, McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,'0 8 in deciding
that the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should be barred in
§ 1962(d) claims.' 0 9
In McAndrew, employees of Lockheed were alleged to have
committed a criminal conspiracy, arising under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and 18
U.S.C. § 1512, and a civil conspiracy, arising under 42 U.S.C. §
1985(2).110 The Eleventh Circuit held that because a criminal conspiracy
was alleged in addition to a civil conspiracy, the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine was inapplicable.' The court reasoned that the
doctrine "was never intended nor used to shield conspiratorial conduct
that was criminal in nature."" 2  Since the underlying conduct was
criminal, the court determined that the doctrine should not be allowed to
bar a civil conspiracy claim." 13  In addition, the court reasoned that
barring the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine furthered the
purpose of § 1985(2), which was to ensure that people were prosecuted
for illegal activity "regardless of their status of incorporation." ' 1 4  In
Kirwin, the Eleventh Circuit applied this same reasoning in determining
that the doctrine should not be allowed to bar § 1962(d) claims.' 15 Since
§ 1962 claims can be brought either in civil or criminal court, the
underlying conduct of a civil RICO conspiracy will almost always be
considered criminal in nature and would disallow the use of the
doctrine. 16 At the same time, the Eleventh Circuit also looked to Cedric
107. Id. at 1326.
108. 206 F.3d 1031 (1 Ith Cir. 2000).
109. See Kirwin, 391 F.3d at 1326-27 (discussing McAndrew and holding that "the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine does not bar § 1962(d) claims").
110. McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1034.
111. See id. at 1040-41 (stating that there should be "a consistent application of the criminal
conspiracy exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine regardless of whether the criminal
conspiracy arises under the federal criminal or civil code").
112. Id.
113. See id. at 1041 (holding that alleging an intracorporate conspiracy also alleged a criminal
conspiracy, therefore the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine cannot apply "regardless of whether the
criminal conspiracy arises under 18 U.S.C. § 371 or under 42 U.S.C. § 1985").
114. Id.
115. See Kirwin v. Price Commc'ns Corp., 391 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that
the McAndrew principle is also applicable to a civil conspiracy claim based on § 1962(d)).
116. See United States v. Palumbo Bros., 145 F.3d 850, 867 (7th Cir. 1998) (noting that RICO
has both civil and criminal penalties).
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Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King 117 to further explain its distinction
between a corporation and its agents."1
8
In Cedric Kushner, the Supreme Court confronted the issue of
whether the sole shareholder of a corporation was distinct from the
corporation.119 Section 1962(c) requires that there be a "person" and an
"enterprise," through which the "person" improperly acts, that are
distinct from each other. 20  The Supreme Court stated that "[t]he
corporate owner/employee, a natural person, is distinct from the
corporation itself, a legally different entity with different rights and
responsibilities due to its different legal status.' 121  The Court also
determined that this was not inconsistent with the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine since the "doctrine turns on specific antitrust
objectives.' 22 While the Supreme Court distinguished a corporation and
a sole shareholder to satisfy the wording of § 1962(c), 123 the Eleventh
Circuit extended this idea of distinct entities in deciding "agents may be
held liable for their own conspiratorial actions" under § 1962(d). 124 With
a three-to-two split in the appellate courts, the issue now is whether the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should not apply in civil RICO
conspiracy claims, or whether the doctrine should apply and bar civil
RICO plaintiffs from bringing § 1962(d) claims where the alleged
conspiracy involves a corporation and its agents.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Rationale for Barring the Use of the Intracorporate Conspiracy
Doctrine is Flawed
The rationale of appellate courts that bar the application of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in civil RICO conspiracy cases is
flawed. The Eleventh Circuit's grouping of civil and criminal
conspiracies together is inappropriate, and a distinction should be made
117. 533 U.S. 158(200!).
118. See Kirwin, 391 F.3d at 1327 (citing Cedric Kushner for the proposition that
"[c]orporations and their agents are distinct entities, and thus, agents may be held liable for their own
conspiratorial actions").
119. Cedric Kushner, 533 U.S. at 160.
120. See id. at 161 (stating that to establish liability under § 1962(c) there must be distinct
entities of a person and an enterprise).
121. Id. at 163.
122. Id. at 166.
123. Id.
124. Kirwin v. Price Commc'ns Corp., 391 F.3d 1323, 1327 (11 th Cir. 2004).
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between the two different types of conspiracies. Also, the Seventh and
Ninth Circuits' belief that the purpose of RICO is threatened by the
application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is an
overexaggeration. The intent of RICO is adequately protected by the
personal-stake exception, agency law, and the other subsections of §
1962. If these principles are applied correctly, then there is little need to
disallow the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The
reasoning of these courts is unconvincing and does not support the
decision to bar the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine.
1. Distinction Should Be Made Between Criminal and Civil
Conspiracies
The Eleventh Circuit, in Kirwin, applied the reasoning of McAndrew
in barring the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in civil RICO
conspiracy claims. 125  The court in McAndrew held simply that "the
criminal conspiracy exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
applies regardless of whether the criminal conspiracy arises under
[federal criminal law] or under [federal civil law].' 26  Since the
conspiracy involved criminal activity that could have resulted in a
criminal conspiracy charge, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine did
not apply. 127  Accordingly, in Kirwin, since the alleged racketeering
activity could have resulted in a criminal RICO conspiracy claim, along
with a civil claim, the doctrine also did not apply. 128 This reasoning for
barring the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is flawed.
There should be a distinction between the use of the doctrine in civil
cases and its use in criminal cases. The underlying purpose of criminal
conspiracy claims, to punish criminals and deter future illegal activity,
outweighs the need to compensate injured plaintiffs. It is this public
necessity to not allow criminals to operate freely which makes the
criminal conspiracy exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
tolerable. Instead of noticing this heightened need for criminal
conspiracy claims, the Eleventh Circuit focused solely on the fact that the
125. Id. at 1326-27.
126. McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206 F.3d 1031, 1041 (11 th Cir. 2000).
127. Id.
128. See Kirwin, 391 F.3d at 1327 (stating that "the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine cannot be
invoked to defeat a § 1962(d) claim"); United States v. Palumbo Bros., 145 F.3d 850, 867 (7th Cir.
1998) (noting that RICO has both civil and criminal penalties).
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underlying conduct is the same in determining that there should be no
distinction between the two types of conspiracies.
29
Rather than the underlying conduct of actions, courts should look at
the identity of the plaintiff and the purpose of the cause of action. In a
criminal RICO conspiracy case, the plaintiff is the government. The
government's remedies for the racketeering activity are to impose prison
sentences and levy fines against the racketeers. 30  The purpose is to
punish the racketeer and deter future violations, not to provide damages
for injuries sustained.' 3 1 If the government cannot distinguish the actor
from the corporation, then the racketeers can effectively shield
themselves from criminal prosecution, and the purpose is defeated. If
conspirators are not punished, then other actors may decide to conduct
similar illegal activities because there are no consequences, causing the
public as a whole to suffer.
On the other hand, the plaintiffs in civil RICO conspiracy cases are
injured parties. The remedies for these injured parties include treble
damages. 132 The main purpose of this remedy is to provide the plaintiff
with compensation for the injuries sustained from the racketeering
activity. 133  While it also has the incidental effect of deterring RICO
violations, since the damages are punitive, 34 the main attraction of civil
RICO plaintiffs is that the injured parties can recover from profiting
racketeers. 35 It is true that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine will
bar a plaintiff from recovering under § 1962(d) in some cases, but there
are exceptions and other provisions of § 1962 that will still provide
RICO plaintiffs adequate compensation for their injuries.
136
Corporations and their agents cannot shield themselves from civil
liability as they could from criminal liability. For this reason, there is a
greater necessity to disallow the use of the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine in criminal cases. The need does not exist in civil RICO
129. McAndrew, 206 F.3d at 1041.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a) (2000).
131. See Michele R. Moretti, Note, Using Civil RICO to Battle Anti-Abortion Violence: Is the
Last Weapon in the Arsenal a Sword of Damocles?, 25 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1363, 1373 (1991)
("[A]ithough RICO's legislative history reflects concern over the infiltration of legitimate businesses
by traditional elements of organized crime, the statute's purpose is general reform designed to deter
patterns of racketeering activity committed by, through, or against an enterprise." (citation omitted)).
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000).
133. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240 (1987).
134. See Michele Ruscio, Note and Comment, The Enforceability ofArbitration Agreements that
Foreclose Statutory Awarded Remedies, 22 J.L. & CoM. 125, 130 (2003) ("The purpose of punitive
damages in the RICO and PMPA statutes is to deter violations.").
135. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 240.
136. See infra Part III.A.2.
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conspiracy cases, and therefore the doctrine should not be barred in these
instances. While the Eleventh Circuit erred in failing to distinguish
between civil and criminal conspiracies, the Seventh and Ninth Circuits'
belief that the purpose of RICO is threatened by the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine is also flawed.
2. Purpose of RICO Act is Not Defeated by the Intracorporate
Conspiracy Doctrine
The main purposes of the RICO Act are to "prevent[] the infiltration
of legitimate businesses by racketeers and separat[e] racketeers from
their profits." 137 The courts in Ashland Oil and Webster asserted that the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should not be used in civil RICO
conspiracy claims since it would defeat this purpose of the Act. 138 This
assertion is flawed for three main reasons: the personal-stake exception
to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine covers many of the situations in
which a RICO conspiracy occurs; agency law covers other situations;
and the other subsections of § 1962 provide adequate protection of the
intent of RICO when these two areas of law do not apply. Almost all
corporate conspiracy claims can be broken down into four scenarios: (1)
an agent or agents conduct racketeering activity outside the scope of
employment to their benefit; (2) an agent or agents conduct racketeering
activity outside the scope of employment but do not profit from the
activity; (3) an agent or agents conduct racketeering activity within the
scope of employment to their benefit; or (4) an agent or agents conduct
racketeering activity within the scope of employment but do not profit.
The personal-stake exception to the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
preserves possible conspiracy claims in the first scenario and possibly the
third scenario.1 39 The use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in the
first two scenarios is restricted according to the principles of agency
law.140 While the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would normally bar
the bringing of a conspiracy claim in scenarios three and four, where an
agent acts within the scope of his employment, the Cedric Kushner case
has made it possible for the other subsections of § 1962 to cover these
two scenarios, at least for the most part. a14  Because these other
137. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989).
138. See supra Part ll.B.3.c.
139. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
140. See infra Part III.A.2.b.
141. See infra Part lIl.A.2.c.
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principles of law adequately preserve the purpose of the RICO Act, the
Seventh and Ninth Circuits' reasoning is without merit.
a. Personal-Stake Exception Protects Against Profiting Conspirators
The personal-stake exception to the intracorporate conspiracy
doctrine protects the intent of the RICO Act in many cases since it allows
for "profiting conspirators" to have conspiracy claims levied against
them. 142 Currently, the exception has only been applied in the Tenth and
Fourth Circuits. 143 There is no reason to bar the use of the personal-stake
exception since it furthers the purpose of RICO. 144 The exception should
be extended to all jurisdictions so that "profiting conspirators" cannot use
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine to bar valid conspiracy claims. In
applying the personal-stake exception, the principle is most applicable in
the scenario where an agent or agents, working outside the scope of
employment, profit from racketeering activity conducted through the
corporation. Part of the difficulty in applying the personal-stake
exception can be in determining whether an agent's stake is truly
"independent."' 145  It is easier to determine that an agent's stake is
independent when the agent's actions are outside the scope of his or her
employment and do not benefit the corporation. The most obvious
scenario for the personal-stake exception occurs when the corporation
itself is a victim. 46 In ePlus Technology, Inc., the defendant created a
"bust-out scheme" to siphon money from the company. 47 This attempt
to steal money from the corporation clearly constituted an independent
personal stake. 
48
The situation is more complex when the agent acts within the scope
of employment while conducting racketeering activity. In this situation,
it may be more difficult to discern that the employee has an
"independent" personal stake. The problem can arise when determining
142. See ePlus Tech., Inc. v. Aboud, 313 F.3d 166, 179 (4th Cir. 2002) (stating that the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine normally bars conspiracy claims between agents and a
corporation).
143. See supra Part I.B.3.b (listing and describing cases that have applied the "personal state
exception").
144. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989) (stating that one of the
purposes of RICO is to "separat[e] racketeers from their profits").
145. See ePlus Tech., 313 F.3d at 179 (stating that the exception "applies only where a co-
conspirator possesses a personal stake independent of his relationship to the corporation").
146. See id. at 179-80 (stating that where an agent siphoned off profits of a corporation, the
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whether an agent has "profited" from their conspiratorial actions. An
agent can own part of a company, either through shares or as a partner,
and therefore indirectly profit from conspiratorial acts conducted within
the scope of his or her employment. Also, an agent may make a
company more prosperous due to the conspiratorial actions and prosper
indirectly through bonuses, raises, or promotions. While the Fourth
Circuit has held that the "personal stake" of an agent must be clear and
not merely "indirect economic interests," it may be difficult to discern
whether the benefits are direct or indirect. 149 The facts of each individual
case will determine whether the personal-stake exception can be used
when an agent acts within the scope of employment and profits from the
conspiratorial actions. The successful use of the exception requires clear
evidence that profit acquired from the conspiracy was separate from the
agent's relationship to the corporation. 5 ° Whether a profiting agent is
acting within or outside the scope of employment, the personal-stake
exception helps to enforce one of the main purposes of the RICO Act,
which is to "separat[e] racketeers from their profits.'' The exception
allows for a RICO plaintiff to both bring a valid conspiracy claim to
recover damages and target the persons who are profiting from the
racketeering activity, the agents. While the personal-stake exception is
helpful in situations where the agent has profited from the conspiracy,
the basic tenets of agency law allow RICO plaintiffs to recover damages
in scenarios where the agent acts outside of the scope of employment.
b. Agency Law Principles Distinguish Outside Actors From
Corporations
Under the principles of agency law, "the acts of a corporation's
agents are considered to be those of a single legal actor."' 152  The
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies this principle: "a corporation
cannot conspire with its employees, and its employees, when acting in
the scope of their employment, cannot conspire among themselves."'
153
This is because "where employees of a corporation associate together to
commit a pattern of predicate acts in the course of their employment and
149. See Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696, 705 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating the "indirect
economic interests" of removing one of the doctors from the market was insufficient to assert the
personal-stake exception).
150. ePlus Tech., 313 F.3d at 179.
151. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Amett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989).




on behalf of the corporation, the employees in association with the
corporation do not form an enterprise distinct from the corporation."' 154 It
should be inferred from this idea, though, that when an employee acts
outside the scope of his or her authority, the action is not that of the
corporation. If the activity is not conducted by the corporation, then it
must be the action of a separate, distinct entity. If an agent acting outside
the scope of his or her authority is distinct from the corporation, then a §
1962(d) claim may be brought, regardless of whether the agent profited
from the conspiracy. This is different from the personal-stake exception,
which would only apply in the scenario where the agent had an
"independent stake" in the conspiracy. 155 The separation of the agent
acting outside the scope of authority from the corporation would help to
further the purpose of the RICO Act as well. A RICO plaintiff could
recover damages from the agent, if the agent was the party who benefited
from the conspiratorial actions, or from the corporation, if it was the
entity that profited. Either way, the racketeers are effectively separated
from their profits, and the plaintiff is compensated for the damages he or
she sustained. 156 Where the employee or agent acts within the scope of
employment, though, the parties are still considered the same entity, but
the other subsections of § 1962 provide adequate protection for the
purpose of the RICO Act.
c. Other Subsections of § 1962 Can Target Racketeering Activity
Recent case law has minimized the importance of intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine situations where an agent or agents conduct
racketeering activity within the scope of employment. As long as the
agents are acting within the scope of their employment, the actions are
seen as if the corporation had conducted them, and the agents "do not
form an enterprise distinct from the corporation."' 57 As far as agency
law is concerned, when the employee goes to work and becomes the
corporation's agent, the two entities merge into one entity. 15 8 Therefore,
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would apply and a RICO plaintiff
could not bring a conspiracy claim against the profiting corporation. The
154. Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 344 (2d Cir.
1994).
155. See supra Part II.A.2.a (discussing personal-stake exceptions).
156. This fulfills the intent of the RICO Act, which is to "separat[e] racketeers from their
profits." Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1281.
157. Riverwoods, 30 F.3d at 344.
158. See id (noting that when the employee acts within the scope of employment he forms a
single entity with a corporation).
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personal-stake exception may address this situation when the agent
benefits from the conspiracy, but the facts may not always support the
application of the exception.'59 In the past, this presented a further
problem.
Pleading requirements have been stringent and have barred many
plaintiffs from bringing § 1962 claims. If a RICO plaintiff could not
bring a conspiracy charge, then he or she would have to look to the other
subsections of § 1962 to try and recover damages. But, the language of
the statute made it difficult to target the entity that benefited from the
racketeering activity and "separat[e] [the] racketeers from their profits,"
as RICO intended. 160 The provisions of § 1962(a), (b), and (c) require
that there be both a "person" and an "enterprise" through which the
"person" conducts the racketeering activity. Under § 1961(3), a
"'person' includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or
beneficial interest in property." 161  While a corporation could fit this
definition of a "person," there is a major obstacle to a plaintiffs claim
against the corporation. These two entities must be distinct from each
other for a plaintiff to assert a violation of RICO. 162 There has to be
'some distinctness between the RICO defendant and the RICO
enterprise."' 163 A RICO claim under subsection (a), (b), or (c) could not
be brought against the agent because while acting within the scope of
employment, the agent is considered part of the corporation, and there is
no distinctness between the two.1 6 4 At the same time, a claim could not
be brought against the corporation since the corporation is both the
"person" and the "enterprise" used to commit the violations. 65 In this
situation, a damaged plaintiff would have no ability to recover damages
under RICO even though a violation had occurred. The Supreme Court
realized the peril caused by the language in the RICO statute and made it
easier to plead a RICO claim.
In Cedric Kushner, the Supreme Court held that when a person is the
sole owner of a corporation, the person is distinct from the corporation
159. See supra Part Il.A.2.a (describing personal-stake exceptions).
160. See Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1281 (stating that the purpose of RICO is to "separat[e]
racketeers from their profits").
161. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (2000).
162. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 161 (2001) (stating that a
"person" and "enterprise" must be shown to exist for a § 1962(c) claim to be alleged).
163. Id. at 162 (quoting Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Cedric
Kushner, 533 U.S. 158 (2001) (No. 00-549)).
164. See id. at 161 (recognizing the distinctness principle of § 1962).
165. See Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Midland Bank, N.A., 30 F.3d 339, 344 (2d
Cir. 1994) ("[A] corporate entity may not be both the RICO person and the RICO enterprise.").
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for the purposes of § 1962(c). 166 While the Supreme Court determined it
did not matter whether the agent's "affairs [are] within the scope, or
beyond the scope, of corporate authority,"1 67 the facts of the Cedric
Kushner case are "that [the sole shareholder] was an employee acting
within the scope of his authority. 168  If the sole shareholder and the
corporation were the same entity, then no valid RICO plaintiff could
assert a RICO claim to recover damages from the racketeering activity.
69
The sole shareholder could effectively shield himself from RICO
liability. 170 Therefore, the Supreme Court determined that the sole
shareholder and the corporation were distinct entities for the sake of the
language of the RICO Act. 17 1  This distinction should be narrowly
construed to the subsections of § 1962(a), (b), and (c), though, where the
distinction between a "person" and "enterprise" is necessary to
effectively plead a claim. If there were no distinction, then a RICO
plaintiff would be effectively barred from bringing any type of RICO
claim in this scenario. The Court's distinction in Cedric Kushner now
provides adequate recourse for RICO plaintiffs because they can bring
claims asserting the agent as the "person" and the corporation as the
"enterprise" through which the "person" conducted racketeering activity,
thus satisfying the stringent language of § 1962(a), (b), and (c). While
this provides plaintiffs adequate recourse when the agents, acting within
the scope of authority, profit from the conspiracy, a problem arises when
the agents act within the scope of employment but do not profit from the
racketeering activity.
In the situation where the corporation benefits from the racketeering
activity but the agent does not, the RICO plaintiff still cannot bring a
claim against the corporation. While Cedric Kushner distinguished the
agents from the corporation to circumvent the language of § 1962(a), (b),
and (c), it did not declare that a corporation was separate from itself.
72
A RICO plaintiff cannot assert that the corporation is both the "person"
and the "enterprise." The plaintiff could target and recover damages
from the agents who conducted the racketeering activity, but the
corporation is the entity that truly profited. There has been some attempt
166. Cedric Kushner, 533 U.S. at 166.
167. Id.
168. Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 219 F.3d 115, 117 (2d Cir. 2000) (emphasis
added), rev'd, 533 U.S. 158.
169. See Cedric Kushner, 533 U.S. at 161 (recognizing the distinctness principle of§ 1962).
170. See id. at 165 (noting that important targets of RICO would be immunized from liability).
171. Id. at 165 66.
172. See id. at 166 (holding only that the separateness principle occurs where the agent is the
sole shareholder of the corporation).
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to apply respondeat superior liability, which would make "[a]n employer
[] vicariously liable . . . for employee action taken within the scope of
employment ... with intent to benefit the employer."' 7 3 If this principle
could be applied, then a RICO plaintiff could target the corporation
vicariously and successfully recover damages from the true profiteer. In
general, the "rules of agency law apply absent Congressional intent to the
contrary."' 174  In RICO, however, there is a "Congressional intent to
create an exception to the general rule of respondeat superior."'
' 75
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit has held a corporation to be vicariously
liable in a RICO claim.' 76 But the corporation could only be vicariously
liable if it was the RICO defendant and not the "enterprise" through
which the racketeering activity was conducted. 77 In Davis, the insurance
corporation was held to be distinct from the insurance agency.
178
Therefore, the corporation was brought as a RICO defendant, and the
insurance agency was the "enterprise" through which the racketeering
activity was conducted. 79 In most instances, though, this specific factual
situation will not occur, and the injured plaintiff will only be able to
recover from the corporation's agents, even though they did not directly
profit from the racketeering activity.
A RICO plaintiff may be able to recover from the profiting
corporation if the corporation's subsidiaries are involved. The
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine applies similarly to a corporation and
its subsidiaries as it does to a corporation and its agents. 180 A corporation
and its subsidiaries do not have different rights and responsibilities like a
corporation and its employees.18' The two share a "single
consciousness," and should therefore be treated as a single entity.' 82 At
the same time, it is possible for the corporation and its subsidiaries to be
distinct for the purposes of § 1962:'183
173. D & S Auto Parts, Inc. v. Schwartz, 838 F.2d 964, 967 (7th Cir. 1988).
174. Id. at 968.
175. Id. (emphasis omitted).
176. Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 6 F.3d 367, 379-80 (6th Cir. 1993).
177. See id at 379 (stating that "plaintiffs may not use RICO to impose liability vicariously on
corporate 'enterprises,' because to do so would violate the distinctness requirement").
178. Id. at 377.
179. Id. at379-80.
180. Chen v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1109 (N.D. Il. 2001).
181. Cf Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 163 (2001) (noting that a
person and a corporation have "different rights and responsibilities due to [their] different legal
status[es]").
182. Fogie v. THORN Ams., Inc., 190 F.3d 889, 899 (8th Cir. 1999).
183. See Lorenz v. CSX Corp., I F.3d 1406, 1412 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that the corporation can
be the defendant and the subsidiary can be the "enterprise").
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[While] theoretically possible for a parent corporation to be the
defendant and its subsidiary to be the enterprise under section 1962(c).
• . , the plaintiff must plead facts which, if assumed to be true, would
clearly show that the parent corporation played a role in the
racketeering 4 activity which is distinct from the activities of its
subsidiary. 4
The facts of each case will determine whether a parent corporation
may be distinguished from its subsidiaries. If the factfinder determines
that the two entities are distinct, then a RICO plaintiff could bring a
claim against the corporation defendant, asserting the corporation as the
"person" and the subsidiary as the "enterprise" through which the
racketeering activity was conducted. This would allow the RICO
plaintiff to recover from the entity with the biggest pockets, and it would
further the intent of RICO by targeting the party that truly profited from
the racketeering activity: the corporation.
In general, the purpose of RICO is adequately protected even without
the dissolution of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine. The personal-
stake exception, agency law, and the other subsections of § 1962 allow
for civil RICO plaintiffs to bring claims to recover damages incurred
from the racketeering activity of actors and corporations. At the same
time, these principles further the purpose of RICO by "separating
racketeers from their profits."'' 85 Even though these other principles of
law protect the purpose of RICO, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
should still be barred in civil RICO conspiracy cases.
IV. RICO SHOULD BE AMENDED TO EXPLICITLY PROHIBIT
INTRACORPORATE CONSPIRACIES
A. Public Policy Calls for a Removal of the Intracorporate Conspiracy
Doctrine in RICO Cases
While the provisions of § 1962 provide adequate protection for civil
plaintiffs victimized by racketeering activity, even with the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, the doctrine should not apply in civil
RICO conspiracy cases. Either explicit language should be added to §
1962(d) or the doctrine should be judicially dissolved by the Supreme
Court. The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should not be allowed to
bar § 1962(d) claims, partly to ensure the purpose of RICO is not
184. Id.
185. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1281 (7th Cir. 1989).
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threatened by the unique situation where an employee, acting within the
scope of employment, benefits the corporation and not himself.186 Also,
the doctrine should be disallowed partly to ensure that RICO plaintiffs
have an extra claim in the event they are unable to factually prove a
claim under § 1962(a), (b), or (c). But the primary reason the use of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in RICO conspiracies should be
barred is to provide a deterrent for both agents and corporations alike.
The recent need for drastic corporate reform measures requires
increasing deterrents to illegal behavior in the corporate setting, and the
dissolution of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in RICO conspiracy
cases provides an extra incentive for corporate agents to refrain from
illegal business practices.
1. A Loophole in RICO Protection Exists
While the personal-stake exception, agency law, and the other
subsections of § 1962 adequately protect the intent of the RICO Act and
provide compensation to injured plaintiffs, there may be a unique
situation where the purpose is not fully defended. In most situations, the
personal-stake exception or agency law will allow a § 1962(d) claim to
be brought against a corporation.' 87  In other situations, the other
subsections of § 1962 will protect the intent of RICO where a conspiracy
cannot be established.188 But in the situation where an employee acts
within the scope of employment to benefit the corporation, a RICO
plaintiff will be able to recover from the agents but not the corporation
itself 18 9  The possibility that a corporation, which benefits from the
racketeering activity of its agents, will go unpunished creates a two-fold
problem. First, the RICO plaintiff may not be able to recover sufficiently
since it is limited to recovering from the agents rather than the often
more resourceful corporation. Second, the intent of the RICO Act may
be threatened since the profiteer is not separated from his profits. 190 The
situation where an agent conducts racketeering activity, without directly
profiting, to the benefit of his employer may be rare, but regardless, it
produces a loophole in the established law. If the use of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine was barred, either legislatively or
186. See supra Part Il.A.2.c.
187. See supra Part lll.A.2.a-b.
188. See supra Part II.A.2.c.
189. See supra Part III.A.2.c.
190. See Ashland Oil, 875 F.2d at 1281 (noting that one of the purposes of RICO is to
"separat[e] racketeers from their profits").
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judicially, then a RICO plaintiff could bring a § 1962(d) claim against
both the agent and the corporation. This would solve both aspects of the
problem within the scenario. A RICO plaintiff could target the deeper
pockets of the corporation to ensure that he or she received adequate
compensation for damages caused by the racketeering activity. Also, the
dissolution of the doctrine fulfills the purpose of the RICO Act by
separating the profiting racketeer, the corporation, from its profits.
2. Section 1962(d) Provides an Additional Claim for RICO Plaintiffs
The dissolution of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine would
provide plaintiffs an extra claim to recover damages. The ruling in
Cedric Kushner has likely diminished the importance of § 1962(d)
claims since it is now easier to bring a claim under the other subsections
of § 1962.191 But even in situations where a plaintiff can effectively
plead a claim against the true profiting racketeer, the facts of the case
may not allow the plaintiff to sufficiently prove to a factfinder that a
RICO violation occurred. While § 1962(d) makes it "unlawful for any
person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (b),
or (c) of [§ 1962],"192 a RICO plaintiff is not required to prove that a
RICO violation of one of these subsections occurred. 193 A conspiracy
fails only "if the pleadings do not state a substantive RICO claim upon
which relief may be granted."'' 94 Barring the use of the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine allows a RICO plaintiff to bring at least two claims
to increase the chances that he or she will adequately recover damages
for injuries suffered as a result of racketeering activity.
191. Removing the hassle of separating an actor from the corporation makes it harder for claims
to fail at the pleading stage. See Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, 533 U.S. 158, 165 (2001)
(noting that treating the actor and corporation as a single entity would immunize individuals from
liability and thus bar valid claims).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (2000).
193. See Efron v. Embassay Suites (P.R.), Inc., 223 F.3d 12, 21 (1st Cir. 2000) ("A conspiracy
claim under section 1962(d) may survive a factfinder's conclusion that there is insufficient evidence
to prove a RICO violation.").
194. Id.
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3. RICO Conspiracies Would Provide a Deterrent to Illegal Business
Practices
a. There Has Been a Recent Shift Toward Increased Corporate Reform
While providing a RICO plaintiff with an additional claim and
protecting the purpose of RICO are important, the most pressing need for
the dissolution of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is to provide a
deterrent to illegal corporate practices. A trend of increased corporate
reform has emerged since the scandals of companies like Enron and
WorldCom.195  The collapse of these two giants left "a devastating
impact on the companies involved, their creditors, shareholders, and
employees."' 96 While several other companies have experienced similar
scandals, 197 no other scandals were as public or left as great an impact on
the economy as WorldCom and Enron.' 98 Within six months, the two
corporations filed the two largest bankruptcy filings ever, resulting in
numerous creditors who did not receive full repayment of their loans.
199
The collapses had an even more devastating impact on shareholders and
employees.200  At Enron, at least 6000 employees were laid off and
shareholders experienced a loss of $179.3 billion.20' At WorldCom,
17,000 employees lost their jobs and shareholders suffered over $66
billion in losses.20 2 Employees at both companies also experienced the
loss of their retirement savings as a result of the collapses.20 3 In addition,
the scandals had a national impact, resulting in substantial drops in the
stock markets and the consumer confidence index.204 While some critics
attempted to place the blame for the scandals either on the accounting
executives or corporate executives,20 5 the underlying problems that led to
these occurrences were "festering for years, and may be inextricably tied
195. Carl W. Mills, Breach of Fiduciary Duty as Securities Fraud: SEC v. Chancellor Corp., 10
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 439, 439 (2005).
196. Lisa M. Fairfax, Form Over Substance?: Officer Certification and the Promise of Enhanced
Personal Accountability Under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 8-9 (2002).
197. See id. at 6-8 (noting scandals or earning restatements at Xerox, Rite Aid, Adelphia, and
AOL).






204. Id. at 9-10.
205. Id. at 11.
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to the corporate form itself. '206 The situations that occurred at Enron and
WorldCom demonstrated the need for greater federal government power
in corporate governance.
This need was based on the inability of "market forces and state
regulatory regimes to adequately protect shareholders and the public."
20 7
In order to shore up this weakness in the market, the federal government,
especially the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), has
increased its role in regards to corporate governance.20 8 One of
Congress's biggest actions has been to enact the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.20 9
The main goals of the Act are to "[m]ake management more accountable,
[i]ncrease required disclosures, [s]trengthen the authority and obligations
of corporate gatekeepers and outsiders, [r]emove conflicts of interest of
management, auditors, gatekeepers and advisors, [r]egulate auditors
more strongly, [s]trengthen the SEC, [and] [i]mprove guidance about
accounting standards., 210  The provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley cover a
wide array of corporate issues, including the creation of an accounting
oversight board, the certification of financial records by CEOs and
CFOs, the creation of auditor independence, and the requirement of fully
independent audit committees, to name a few.21 1 The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act has had a number of benefits since its enactment. By focusing on the
accounting methods and internal controls of companies, the Act "has
unearthed lingering problems in the way companies operate. 21 2  In
addition, it has fixed accounting problems created by lax financial
controls. 213  Sarbanes-Oxley has given companies "an opportunity to
evaluate their business and make positive changes that can benefit
shareholders. 214 As companies look internally to comply with the new
regulations, the increase in information leads to more efficient business
practices. 2  Arguably the best result is that increased disclosure spurred
206. Mills, supra note 195, at 439.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Don A. Moore, SarbOx Doesn't Go Far Enough, BUS. WK., Apr. 17, 2006, at 112.
210. Beverley Earle & Gerald A. Madek, The New World of Risk for Corporate Attorneys and
Their Boards Post-Sarbanes-Oxley: An Assessment of Impact and a Prescription for Action, 2
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 185, 190 (2005).
211. Marianne M. Jennings, A Primer on Enron: Lessons From a Perfect Storm of Financial
Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 163, 243-44
(2003).
212. David Henry et al., Death, Taxes, & Sarbanes-Oxley?, BUS. WK., Jan. 17, 2005, at 28.
213. Id.
214. Cory L. Braddock, Penny Wise, Pound Foolish: Why Investors Would Be Foolish to Pay a
Penny or a Pound for the Protections Provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, 2006 BYU L. REV. 175, 183
(2006).
215. Id. at 183-84.
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by Sarbanes-Oxley has increased investor confidence in the accuracy of
companies' reportings.216 By requiring independent audit committees,
the Act "provide[s] investors with a transparent picture of what is
happening within a company. ' '217  Sarbanes-Oxley has helped to
strengthen these independent auditors and remind them "that they work
for, and report to, the audit committee and not senior management."
2 8
In the least, Sarbanes-Oxley has impacted a wide array of business fields
and has proved effective at restoring some investor confidence in the
market.
b. Critics Argue that Further Corporate Reform is Not Needed
While the need for a response to the Enron and WorldCom scandals
was obvious at the time, recently there have been criticisms of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and corporate reform in general. The main criticism
of Sarbanes-Oxley is that the benefits are outweighed by the costs.219 It
cannot be denied that the costs of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley are
high.220 The costs mostly stem from increased external auditor fees and
the implementation of internal control systems.221 The Act has proved to
be at least ten times more expensive than the SEC expected.222 The
average cost of implementing measures to comply with the Act is around
$35 million for companies with $4 billion or more in revenue.
223
Arguably the most expensive provision of Sarbanes-Oxley is Section
404, which "requires that corporate executives and their auditors
document, and certify to investors, that their internal financial controls
work properly. 2 24 This requires a large amount of money, manpower,
and paperwork, which could be better spent focusing on business
objectives. 225 The costs of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley have also
resulted in the de-listing of companies and the refusal of private
216. Henry et al., supra note 212, at 28.
217. Braddock, supra note 214, at 181-82.
218. Id. at 182.
219. Robert B. Ahdieh, From "Federalization" to "Mixed Governance" in Corporate Law: A
Defense of Sarbanes-Oxley, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 727 (2005).
220. Henry et al., supra note 212, at 28.
221. Tosha Huffman, Note, Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Where the Knee Jerk Bruises
Shareholders and Lifts the External Auditor, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 239, 254-55 (2004).
222. Alistair Barr, SEC: Scale Back Sarbanes-Oxley, MARKETWATCH, Dec. 9, 2005, http://
www.marketwatch.com/search (type "SEC: Scale Back Sarbanes-Oxley").





companies to go public.22 6 This poses a double problem for investors in
that they are passed on the costs of compliance, and they have fewer
investment options. 227  In addition, if investors are forced to invest in
private equity firms, then their risk increases since these companies do
not abide by the stringent requirements of publicly traded companies.
228
As a result of these large costs of compliance, critics argue that the
"'pendulum' ha[s] swung too far [in favor of regulation] in response to
the Enron and WorldCom corporate scandals., 229 The critics feel that
increased regulation and corporate reform is unnecessary since the costs
of existing legislation far outweigh the benefits of deterring future
questionable business practices.
c. There Should Be an Expansion of RICO to Aid in Corporate Reform
While there are problems with Sarbanes-Oxley and other corporate
reform measures, there is still a need for further corporate reform to
ensure that corporate agents are effectively deterred from conducting
illegal practices. There is fraudulent activity ongoing in corporate
America, and more stringent legislation is necessary to prevent these
questionable business practices from continuing. This is evidenced in
the large number of financial restatements that have occurred. Since the
enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley "[s]ixty-seven percent of U.S. companies
have had to restate their financial results., 230  The number of restated
reportings almost doubled from 2002 to 2005.231 The fact that two-thirds
of American companies have declared that their reported earnings are
incorrect suggests that further corporate reform is necessary to make
public companies truly transparent. While the costs of transparency are
considerable, the result is a more accurate valuation of companies.
232
True valuations of corporations benefit employees, investors, creditors,
and the economy as a whole.23 3 In addition, legislation like Sarbanes-
226. Thomas Kostigen, Stuff a S-OX in It, MARKETWATCH, Aug. 4, 2006, http://
www.marketwatch.com/search (type "Stuff a S-OX in it"; then choose "At 4, Sarbanes-Oxley Worth
Celebrating, Not Maligning") (quoting Neal Wolkoff, chairman and chief executive of the American
Stock Exchange).
227. Braddock, supra note 214, at 176.
228. Id.
229. Kostigen, supra note 226.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See id. (noting that the enactment of corporate reform measures has resulted in a more
accurate reflection of company valuations).
233. Cf Fairfax, supra note 196, at 8-9 (noting that the collapses of Enron and WorldCom,
caused by over valuations, had "a devastating impact on the companies involved, their creditors,
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Oxley was "hastily enacted," and therefore, still has gaps that need to be
filled in order to deter questionable business practices. 234  Sarbanes-
Oxley has been considered "emergency legislation" enacted in response
to the "frenetic media coverage of [corporate scandals]., 235 Because of
the haste with which it was enacted, Sarbanes-Oxley "poses significantly
greater risks of both honest mistakes and special interest abuse. 236 It has
also been argued that a lack of foresight has led to too much
concentration of corporate governance power in one agency, the SEC.23 7
The criticism is that the SEC "has long been prone to regulatory
overreaching" and has had a "longstanding agenda to insert itself into
corporate governance. 238  With continuing questionable business
practices that cannot be curbed solely with existing legislation, there is a
need for increased corporate reform.
In order to continue the trend and further deter illegal business
activity, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should be dissolved in
civil RICO conspiracy claims. While originally one of the purposes of
the RICO Act was to confront white-collar crime, this application has for
the most part been disregarded.239 The provisions of RICO "could be a
powerful weapon against corporate crime, if it enjoyed the scope and
force Congress originally intended., 240  Barring the use of the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is one possible way to strengthen the
provisions of RICO to confront the increase in white-collar crime. This
modification will increase accountability in corporate governance and
further deter high-ranking corporate officials from committing fraudulent
acts. Plaintiffs are allowed to recover treble damages to specifically
deter violations of the RICO Act.24' In addition to the consequences of a
Sarbanes-Oxley violation, the possibility of having to pay treble damages
provides an extra incentive for a corporation's agents to act within the
boundaries of the law.242  At the same time, the dissolution of the
doctrine will fill at least one of the gaps in current legislation, while
diverting some of the power of corporate governance away from the SEC
shareholders, and employees").
234. See Earle & Madek, supra note 210, at 189 (examining the legislation, specifically as it
relates to attorneys, and noting the flaws).
235. Ahdieh, supra note 219, at 728.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 728-29.
238. Id.
239. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 283.
240. Id.
241. Ruscio, supra note 134, at 130.




and back to the courts. While the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley have
helped increase deterrence of illegal business practices, the strengthening
of the RICO Act, by excluding the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine,
can only help to further corporate reform.
d. Implications of the Dissolution of the Intracorporate Conspiracy
Doctrine
Barring the use of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in civil
RICO conspiracy claims will have several implications, both positive and
negative. The dissolution of the doctrine will lead to increased costs for
American corporations. These corporations already spend large amounts
of money to comply with the provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley. 243 Now,
these same corporations will have to spend more money, both in the form
of attorney's fees and court costs (because of the increase in overall
RICO claims) and in the form of damages (because of the increase in
successful RICO claims). These costs could possibly be passed on to
investors and the American public as a whole. In addition, the less
stringent requirements for bringing § 1962(d) claims will result in an
influx of new RICO conspiracy claims. It could be argued that the ruling
in Cedric Kushner has already led to a rise in the number of RICO
lawsuits due to its distinction of "person" and "enterprise." However,
there is a strong likelihood that the dissolution of the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine will lead to another increase in RICO claims. The
increase in claims will likely lead to more congested federal courts and
an increase in frivolous lawsuits, thus increasing the burden on the public
as a whole.
While the costs of dissolving the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine
will be high, the benefits outweigh these consequences. Though the
increase in RICO claims may increase frivolous lawsuits, the influx of
claims will also result in more successful injured parties receiving
adequate compensation for the damages they suffer as a result of
corporations' racketeering activity. The increased costs do not remove
the need to provide injured parties a way for recovering from illegally
profiting corporations. Additionally, the dissolution of the intracorporate
conspiracy doctrine will lead to greater awareness among corporate
officers of the implications of questionable business activity. Liability
will have severe consequences for agents, since plaintiffs may recover
243. See supra Part III.A.3.b.
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treble damages.244 This possibility will lead agents to think twice before
conducting questionable business activities. Agents need to be informed
of the consequences of their actions now that they may be liable for
conspiracies under § 1962(d). It is hoped that since the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley companies have educated employees on the
ramifications of the recent legislation. Corporations should continue this
education on corporate reform with either in-house instruction or
required outside seminars. Greater education and awareness will lead to
more knowledgeable agents, which would in turn lead to fewer illegal
acts and conspiracies. This will result in lower costs for corporations and
individual investors. While there are negative effects of barring the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, the benefits of deterring illegal
business activity and compensating injured parties are far greater. In
order to further corporate reform and realize these benefits, the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should no longer apply in situations
involving civil RICO conspiracies.
V. CONCLUSION
The intracorporate conspiracy doctrine is an outdated legal principle
in the realm of RICO conspiracies. There is nothing incorrect about the
original application of the doctrine in antitrust litigation or its subsequent
extension to federal discrimination claims. The doctrine, though, should
cease to apply in conspiracy claims arising under § 1962(d). The
Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits assert this same proposition. But
the reasons stated by these appellate courts are unpersuasive. The
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should not fail in civil RICO
conspiracy cases merely because the underlying conduct is "criminal in
nature." Additionally, the doctrine should not be barred because it
threatens the purpose of RICO. As was stated earlier, the personal-stake
exception, agency law, and the other subsections of § 1962 provide
adequate protection both for injured plaintiffs and for the intent of RICO.
Instead, the dissolution of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine in RICO
claims is the logical next step in furtherance of corporate reform. Since
the collapse of WorldCom and Enron, the federal government has
enacted increasingly stringent legislation to deter questionable business
practices. These actions have proved expensive and time-consuming for
corporations to comply with, and there is an argument that the corporate
244. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2000) (stating that a civil plaintiff can bring a claim under § 1962
and receive punitive damages).
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reform measures already enacted are sufficient or maybe even too strict.
However, the incentive to cheat the system still exists in corporate
America, and the corporate reform trend should continue in order to deter
corporate officers from conducting illegal business practices. A RICO
conspiracy claim arising under § 1962(d) provides an extra deterrence to
this type of behavior. It provides civil plaintiffs recourse to recover both
damages for injuries sustained from racketeering activity and punitive
damages to deter the conspiring parties. It is for this reason that the
intracorporate conspiracy doctrine should be barred, either legislatively
or judicially. The dissolution of the doctrine produces another deterrent
to illegal business activity, thus taking the next step to further the
expanding trend of corporate reform.
